Sunday, October 29, 2006

Economics of Voting

According to my microeconomics professor (Dr. Mark Showalter), voting in elections is not a rational action to take. In many places, you have to take time out of your day to drive to the polling place, cast your ballot, and drive home. But the effect of your individual vote is essentially zero, since it is highly unlikely that your vote will tip the election one way or the other. So, according to Dr. Showalter, no rational person ought to vote.

On the other hand, Dr. Showalter admits that he personally votes. Why? Mostly out of a vaguely-defined sense of "civic duty". Presumably, he gets some personal utility out of casting his ballot, and so he does so every year. His argument is that if you are going to vote, it should not be because you think you will make a difference by voting.

I recently mailed in my ballot for this year's midterm election. I'm registered to vote in Washington where almost everybody votes by mail (in fact, that is the only way to vote in 34 out of Washington's 39 counties). So, for me (presumably), the cost of voting is not nearly as significant -- I can sit here in my apartment and vote at my leisure. Is it more rational to vote like this? Perhaps, but since the candidates I voted for are heavily favored to win, I still don't have much hope of actually influencing the election. (In fact, there were about 15 unopposed races on the ballot. I skipped all of these.)

So is it a good idea to vote? It probably doesn't do too much harm. Plus, there's the argument that if everyone acted rationally and did not vote, then it would become a rational act for one person to vote and determine the entire election. So, voting must be rational on some level... but it probably is not in general.

Friday, October 27, 2006

Free Will

Do humans have free will? I like to think about this in terms of computer programs, for whatever reason. Consider the following computer programs (assuming no errors in software or hardware):

1. A program that displays the message "Hello". This program cannot reasonably said to have free will. Its creator knows what will happen every time it is ever run.

2. A program that asks the user to input a string of text and displays whatever was input. In this case, the program has no free will. Its creator does not have any idea what the result will be each time the program is run. However, given a certain input, the program is guaranteed to produce a certain output.

3. A program that displays a (pseudo-)random number (say, between 0 and 1). This program cannot reasonably said to have free will either. Although its output is not easily predictable, it is still governed by the specific algorithm for generating random numbers. This algorithm, given the same inputs, will produce the same output every time. In a sense, the creator of the program "knows" what the result will be.

4. A program that accurately simulates a human brain. Now, of course, neither the hardware nor the understanding required for such a program currently exists. But let's suppose that it did. I contend that such a program is possible. Given a particular state of the electrons in a brain, there are specific rules (whether or not they are currently understood) that dictate where these electrons will flow. By "programming" such rules, one could potentially simulate a human brain.

Could this program be said to have free will? I don't know, but I lean toward saying no. It is simply operating under the instructions given to it; in a sense, it is nothing more than a complicated combination of the first three types of programs mentioned above. Given a certain input, it doesn't seem reasonable to conclude that the program can "decide" on its own which output to produce. If the program did have free will, which additional line of code gave it "free will"? Is there something specific that divides entities with "free will" from entities without it? Finally, in what way is this program different from a "real human"?

I don't know the answers to these questions, which is probably why I don't find free will to be convincing (although I'm willing to be convinced otherwise). But this leads to a rather fatalistic, depressing view of the universe. So I try not to think about it too often.

Thursday, October 26, 2006

How To Fail

In seventh grade, I was in a required speech class at my junior high school. One of the speeches we had to give had to be a "how-to" speech, describing the best way to perform a particular task. Out of ideas, I decided to give my speech on "How to Fail Your Speech". My grade for the assignment? 100%.

So, I'm a grader for the math department here at BYU. Often, students will turn in papers that, for one reason or another, deserve a less-than-optimal score. Therefore, I present (based, unfortunately, in reality):

How Not to Do Well on Your Math Assignment

1. Don't write your name on your paper. This is completely unnecessary and may result in you actually receiving credit for the work you did.

2. Hand in a large quantity of work, preferably at least 10 pages stapled together. But, make sure that you do not do all the problems assigned and to do plenty of unassigned problems. Although the grader may be impressed by the sheer volume of work you produced, this is doubtful.

3. Alternatively, hand in a very small quantity of work. In fact, ideally, you would just write down the numbers of all the problems without actually doing any work related to the problems assigned.

4. Write in letters so small that no one can possibly tell what you have written, especially the grader.

5. Alternatively, organize your work in such a fashion that following it is very difficult. Working problems from right to left on the page, for example, works well. Also, it's best to give no indication of which part of your work is the actual answer.

6. Finally, write an amusing note to the grader about how horrible your life is and how you just can't possibly succeed. The grader will laugh mercilessly and enjoy giving you your deserved low score.